

TO THE PRINCE REGENT:

ON THE DISPUTE WITH AMERICA.

LETTER II.

SIR,

Intelligence, received since the date of the former Letter, which I did myself the honour to address to your Royal Highness, makes it more imperious upon us to examine well the grounds upon which we are proceeding with regard to the American States. The President has called the Congress together; and, there can be little doubt of his object being to propose to them, for their approbation, some measure more of a warlike character than any which he has hitherto adopted; nor, can we, it seems to me, be at all surprized at this, if, as is rumoured, it be true, that Mr. Foster, our new minister in America, has made a communication to the American government; making the revocation of our Orders in Council depend upon the conduct of Napoleon as to the Continental System.

The rise and progress of the Orders in Council and of the French Decrees have already been noticed, and sufficiently dwelt upon; it has been shown, that the grounds of the present dispute, namely, the flagrant violation of neutral rights, did not originate with France, but with England, or, if not with England, with Prussia; it has been shown, and no one will attempt to deny the fact, that the French Decrees were passed *after* the issuing of our Orders in Council; that they were passed expressly in the way of retaliation; that they were to be revoked when we revoked our Orders. It has been shown, that we professed to be animated with a sincere and most earnest desire to revoke our Orders, and, indeed, that we expressly declared, that we would revoke them whenever the French would revoke their Decrees. It has been shown, that the French officially informed the American Government, that the Decrees were revoked, and that, thereupon, the American Government called upon us to fulfil our promises in revoking our Orders; but, that we did not do this; that we

evaded the fulfilment of these promises, and, in short, that we have not revoked, or softened the rigour of, any part of our Orders. It has, in a word, been shown, that, while the French have revoked their Decrees, while they, in consequence of the remonstrances of America, have ceased to violate her neutral rights, we persevere in such violation.

The pretext for this was, at first, that the Emperor Napoleon, though he *said* he had revoked his Decrees, had *not* done it, and meant not to do it. This, may it please your Royal Highness, was, it appears to me, a very strange kind of language to use towards other powers. It was treating the American government as a sort of political idiot. It was telling it that it did not understand the interests of America, and that it was unworthy to be entrusted with power. And, it was saying to the Emperor of France, that he was to be regarded as shut out of the pale of sovereigns; that he was on no account to be believed; that no faith was to be given to the official communications of his ministers, or of any persons treating in his name. Thus, then, the door against peace, against exchange of prisoners, against a softening of the rigours of war in any way or in any degree, was for ever barred; and, the termination of war was, in fact, made to depend upon the death of Napoleon.

But, this pretext could not last long; for, the Decrees were actually revoked; the revocation went into effect; and those Decrees are now wholly dead as to any violation of the neutral rights of America. It was, therefore, necessary to urge some new objection to the revocation of our Orders in Council; and, it is now said, that Mr. Foster has demanded, that, as a condition of the revocation of our Orders in Council, the French shall revoke all the commercial regulations which they have adopted since the Orders in Council were issued; that is to say, that Napoleon shall give up what he calls the Continental System, and *admit English goods into the Continent of Europe.*

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I do not say, may it please your Royal Highness, that Mr. Foster has been instructed to make such a demand: I state the proposition as I find it described in our own public prints; but, this I can have no hesitation in saying, that a proposition so replete with proof of having flowed from impudence and ignorance the most consummate is not to be found in the history of the diplomacy of the universe. The Government of America can have no right whatever to interfere with the internal regulations of the French Empire or of any other country; and, the Continental System, as it is called, consists merely of internal regulations. These regulations have nothing at all to do with the *rights of neutrals*; they do not violate, in any degree, any of those rights; and, therefore, America cannot, without setting even common sense at defiance, be called upon to demand an abandonment of that system.

But, Sir, permit me to stop here and to examine a little into what that system really is. It forbids the importation into the Empire of Napoleon and the states of his allies any article being the manufacture, or produce, of England or her colonies. This, in a few words, is the Continental System. And, your Royal Highness certainly need not be reminded, that it is a system which has been very exactly copied from the commercial code of England herself. Your Royal Highness's ministers and many members of Parliament have spoken of this system as the effect of vindictiveness on the part of Napoleon; as the effect of a mad despotism, which threatens Europe with a return of the barbarous ages; but, I see nothing in this system that has not long made part of our own system. It is notorious, that the goods manufactured in France are prohibited in England; it is notorious that French wine and brandy are forbidden to be brought hither; in short, it is notorious that no article being the manufacture or produce of France is permitted to be brought into England; and, that seizure, confiscation, fine, imprisonment, and ruin attend all those who act in infraction of this our commercial code.

This being the case, it does seem to require an uncommon portion of impudence or of self-conceit for us to demand of the Americans to cause the Continental System to be abandoned as a condition upon

which we are willing to *cease to violate their rights*. But, it has been said, that Napoleon enforces his system with so much rigour and barbarity. This does not at all alter the state of the case between us and America, who has no power, and, if she had the power, who has no right, to interfere with his internal regulations. Yet, Sir, it is not amiss to inquire a little into the fact of this alledged barbarity of Napoleon. All rulers are content with accomplishing their object; and, in this case, it would not be his interest to inflict greater penalties than the accomplishing of his object required. Our own laws against smuggling are not the mildest in the world; and, we have seen them hardened by degrees, till they answered the purpose that the government had in view. We have been told, indeed, that Napoleon punishes offences against his commercial code with enormous fines, with imprisonment, and we have heard of instances where he has resorted to the punishment of death. These severities have been made the subject of most grievous complaints against him here; they have brought down upon him reproaches the most bitter; they have been cited as proofs indubitable of the intolerable despotism, under which his people groan. But, Sir, I have confidence enough in your justice and magnanimity to remind you, that there is nothing which his commercial code inflicts; that there is nothing in any of the punishments that even rumour has conveyed to our ears; no, nothing, in any of these surpassing in severity; nay, nothing in any of them equalling in severity, the punishments provided for in the commercial code of England, having for their object, towards France, precisely that in view which the Continental system has in view towards England, namely, her embarrassment, and, finally, her overthrow.

In support of this assertion I could cite many of the acts in our statute book; but I allude particularly to that which was passed in the month of May 1793, at the breaking out of the war against the republicans of France. That act, which appears to have been drawn up by the present Lord Chancellor, makes it High-treason, and punishes with death, and also with forfeiture of estates, all those persons, residing or being in Great Britain, who shall have any hand whatever, either directly or indirectly, in selling any goods (mentioned in the said act) to the French government,



or to any body residing in French territories. This act punishes in the same awful manner, any one who shall send a Bank note to any one residing in the French territory, or shall have any hand, in the most distant manner, in causing such notes to be sent. It punishes in the same manner any person residing or being in Great Britain, who shall have any hand in purchasing any real property in any country under the dominion of France; and it extends its vengeance to all those, who, in the most distant manner, shall have any hand in such transaction. This act is the 27th chap. of the 33rd year of the reign of George the third; and I have never seen and never heard of any act or edict that dealt out death and destruction with so liberal a hand.

It was said at the time, by the present Lord Chancellor, and by the greater part of those men who compose your Royal Highness's ministry, that this act, terrible as it was, was demanded, by the safety of the nation. This Mr. Fox denied, and he strenuously laboured to prevent the passing of an act so severe. I shall offer no opinion upon this matter; but it is certain that the code of Napoleon is not, because it cannot, be more terribly severe than this act; and this being the case, common decency ought to restrain those who justified this act from uttering reproaches against the author of the continental code. Our Government then said that the act of 1793 was necessary in order to crush the revolution that had reared its head in France, and that was extending its principles over Europe. They justified the act upon the ground of its necessity. So does Napoleon his code. He says that that code is necessary to protect the continent against the maritime despotism and the intrigues of England. His accusations against us may be false, but he is only retorting upon us our accusations against France; and between two such powers, there is nobody to judge. In truth our Government passed its act of 1793, because it had the will and the power to pass and to enforce it; and Napoleon has established his continental system, because he also has the will and the power. It is to the judgment of the world that the matter must be left, and I beseech your Royal Highness to consider, that the world will judge of our conduct according to the evidence which it has to judge from, and that that judgment will leave

wholly out of view our interests and our humours.

To return and apply what has here been said to the case on which I have the honour to address your Royal Highness, what answer would have been given to America, if she, in the year 1793, had demanded of our Government the rescinding of the act of which I have just given a faint description? In supposing, even by the way of argument, America to have taken such a liberty, I do a violence to common sense, and commit an outrage upon diplomatic decorum; and it is quite impossible to put into words an expression of that indignation which her conduct would have excited. And yet, Sir, there appears to me, to be no reason whatever for our expecting America to be permitted to interfere with Napoleon's continental system, unless we admit that she had a right to interfere with our act of 1793. The dispute between us and America relates to the acknowledged *rights of neutral nations*. These rights of America we avow that we violate. We have hitherto said, that we were ready to cease such violation as soon as the French did the same; but now, if we are to believe the intelligence from America and the corresponding statements of our public prints, we have shifted our ground, and demand of America that she shall cause the continental system to be done away, or, at least, we tell her that it shall be done away, or we will not cease to violate her rights.

The language of those, who appear to be ready to justify a refusal, upon the ground above stated, to revoke our Orders in Council, is this: that it was *natural* to expect that the revocation would be made to depend upon a *real* and *effectual* abolition of the French decrees; that the revocation is merely nominal unless all the regulations of Napoleon, made since 1806, are also repealed; that when these latter are repealed, it will be right for America to call upon us for a repeal of our Orders in Council, and not before; and, it is added, that the American President will not have the support of the people, if he attempt to act upon any other principles than these. So that, as your Royal Highness will clearly perceive, these persons imagine, or, at least, they would persuade the people of England, that, unless the President insist upon the admission of

English manufactures and produce into the dominions of *France*, he will not be supported by the people of America in a demand of England to cease to violate the known and acknowledged rights of America. The President is not asking for any indulgence at our hands: he is merely asking for what is due to his country; he is merely insisting upon our ceasing to violate the rights of America; and, if what the public prints tell us be true, we say in answer: "We will cease to violate your rights; we will cease to do you wrong; we will cease to confiscate your vessels in the teeth of the law of nations, but not unless Napoleon will suffer the continent of Europe to purchase our manufactures and commerce." If my neighbour complain of me for a grievous injury and outrageous insult committed against him, am I to answer him by saying, that I will cease to injure and insult him, when another neighbour with whom I am at variance will purchase his clothing and cutlery from me? The party whom I injure and insult will naturally say, that he has nothing to do with my quarrel with a third party. We should disdain the idea of appealing to America as a mediatrix, and, indeed, if she were to attempt to put herself forward in that capacity, indignation and vengeance would ring from one end of the kingdom to the other. Yet, we are, it seems, to look to her to cause the French to do away regulations injurious to us, but with which America has nothing at all to do.

As to the disposition of the *people* of America, your Royal Highness should receive with great distrust whatever is said, come from what quarter it may, respecting the popular feeling being against the President and his measures. The same round of deception will, doubtless, be used here as in all other cases where a country is at war with us. It is now nearly twenty years since we drew the sword against revolutionary France; and, if your Royal Highness look back, you will find, that, during the whole of that period, the people of France have been, by those who have had the power of the press in their hands in this country, represented as hostile to their government, under all its various forms, and as wishing most earnestly for the success of its enemies. The result, however, has been, that the people have never, in any one instance, aided those enemies; but have made all sorts of sacri-

fices for the purpose of frustrating their designs. On the contrary, the people in all the countries, allied with us in the war, have been invariably represented as attached to their government, and they have, when the hour of trial came, as invariably turned from that government and received the French with open arms. After these twenty years of such terrible experience, it is not for me to presume, that your Royal Highness can suffer yourself to be deceived with regard to the disposition of the American people, who clearly understand all the grounds of the present dispute, and of whom, your Royal Highness may be assured, Mr. Madison, in his demands of justice at our hands, is but the echo. The Americans do not wish for war: war is a state which they dread: there is no class amongst them who can profit from war: they have none of that description of people, to whom war is a harvest: there are none of those whom to support out of the public wealth the pretext of war is necessary: they dread a standing army: they have witnessed the effects of such establishments in other parts of the world: they have seen, how such establishments and loss of freedom go hand in hand. But, these considerations will not, I am persuaded, deter them from going far enough into hostile measures to do great injury to us, unless we shall, by our acts, prove to them, that such measures are unnecessary.

The public are told, and the same may reach the ear of your Royal Highness (for courts are not the places into which truth first makes its way), that the American President is *unpopular*; that the people are on *our side* in the dispute. Guard your ear, I beseech you, Sir, against such reports, which are wholly false, and which have their rise partly in the ignorance and partly in the venality of those by whom they are propagated. It is a fact, on which your Royal Highness may rely, that, at the last election (in the Autumn of 1810) the popular party had a majority far greater than at any former period; and, it is hardly necessary for me to say how that party stands with regard to England; for, from some cause or other, it does so happen, than in every country where there is a description of persons professing a strong and enthusiastic attachment to public liberty, they are sure to regard England as their enemy. We are told, that these are all sham patriots; that they

are demagogues, jacobins, levellers, and men who delight in confusion and bloodshed. But, Sir, the misfortune is, that these persons, in all the countries that we meddle with, do invariably succeed in the end. Their side proves, at last, to be the strongest. They do, in fact, finally prove to form almost the whole of the people; and, when we discover this, we generally quit their country in disgust, and, since they "will not be true to themselves," we e'en leave them to be punished by their revolutions and reforms. In America, however, it will, I think, be very difficult for any one to persuade your Royal Highness that those who are opposed to us are sham patriots, and men who wish for confusion. Every man in that country has enough to eat; every man has something to call his own. There are no baits for sham patriots; no fat places to scramble for; no sinecures where a single lazy possessor snorts away in the course of the year the fruit of the labour of hundreds of toiling and starving wretches; none of those things, in short, for the sake of gaining which it is worth while to make hypocritical professions of patriotism. As an instance of the sentiments of the people of America with regard to political parties. I beg leave to point out to your Royal Highness the circumstance of *Mr. Pickering* (who is held forth as the great champion of our cause in America) having, at the last election, been put out of the *Senate* of the United States, of which he had long been a member, being one of the Senators for Massachusetts, his native state. The people of the State first elect the two Houses and the Governor of the State, and these elect the persons to serve them in the Senate of the Union. Thus *Mr. Pickering* was, then, rejected, not merely by the people; not merely at a popular election; but by the deliberate voice of the whole legislature of the State. And this, too, in that part of the Union called New England; in the State of Massachusetts too, which State it is well known takes the lead in the Northern part of the country, and which State has always been represented as disposed to divide from the States of the South. If we had friends any where in America, it was in this State; and, yet, even in this State, we see the most unequivocal proof of disaffection to our cause.

It is useless, Sir, for us to reproach the people of America with this disaffection. They must be left to follow their own

taste. In common life, if we find any one that does not like us, we generally endeavour, if we wish to gain his liking, to win him to it by kindness and by benefits of some sort or other. We go thus to work with animals of every description. In cases where we have the power, we but too often make use of that to subdue the disinclined party to our will. But, where we have not the power, we are seldom so very foolish as to deal out reproaches against those whose good will we do not take the pains to gain. It is, therefore, the height of folly in us to complain that the Americans do not like our government, and prefer to it that of Napoleon. The friends of England accuse them of giving support to a *despot*. They do not love despots, Sir, you may be assured; and, if they like Napoleon better than they do our government, it is because *they* think him less inimical to their freedom and their property. This is the ground of their judgment. They are not carried away by words: they look at the acts that affect them; and, upon such grounds, they might, under some circumstances, justly prefer the Dey of Algiers to the ruler of any other state.

I am, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate,
Thursday, 5th September, 1811.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SPAIN—FIGUEIRAS.—Another fortress has fallen before the French, after a long, and, seemingly, a most gallant resistance. But, 3,500 men, amongst whom 350 officers, and many of high rank, are a part of the victor's prize upon this occasion. Our public prints scarcely notice this event. It appears nothing at all to them, who belong to a nation, where City Swords and Parliamentary Thanks and Peerages are given for such achievements as those of Barrosa and Albuera and Talavera. *Three thousand five hundred prisoners!* Do you hear that, you venal men! you crowd of base hirelings! And you greater crowd of dupes! Do you hear of the three thousand five hundred prisoners of war, *sur-rendered at discretion?* Let me ask you, now, what you would say, if such an achievement were accomplished by the Lord Baron Douro and Viscount Talavera and the Conde de Vimeira? What would you say? Where would you begin; and where would you end? What firing of

cannon, ringing of bells, illuminations, bonfires; what paragraphs, what poems, what columns of doggerel from the pen of the pensioned poet Fitzgerald, what nauseous stuff upon the stage, what a singing and what a shouting! There is no forming the most distant idea of what would take place. I should be afraid of the whole nation's going mad: drunk I am sure they would be. And yet, no more notice is taken of this achievement of the Duke of Tarento than if it had been the mere intercepting of a convoy of provisions. What a compliment does this *silence* contain! How eloquent it is in eulogium on the French army and its commanders! For, what will *history* say? Why, that such were their famous deeds, that the capture of a fortress where 3,500 men, including 350 officers, was passed over by their enemies as an event not worthy of particular notice. On the other hand, what will history say of our deeds in arms, when it is recording the subjects of our endless boastings? It is very painful to have to make such remarks; but they are true, and they are called for by the occasion. There is nothing more injurious to the character of a country than boasting without good ground; and, let it be observed, that our army will never be the better for our shutting our eyes against the truth, whether as to their deeds, or to the deeds of the enemy. It is bad policy, besides being unjust and false, not to speak of both as they deserve. The fear of censure is as necessary as the love of praise; and, if praise on our own side is, in all cases, to be bestowed; if we are thus to go on praising our own army through thick and thin; and are to speak contemptuously of all the victories of those to whom it is opposed, where are we to look for the motives to great and gallant deeds? I am for giving to our own army a full measure of commendation. I would deprive no man of it of his due, from the highest to the lowest; and, I would rather over than under do my duty in this respect. But, I would not overlook glaring faults; I would not be silent when I saw Brennier march out of Almeida with a thousand men in the face of the English army. And, on the other hand, I would never suppress a fair account, a candid notice, of the successes of the enemy. This is the only way, in which, as far as relates to these matters, the press can be useful: not pursuing this course it must, indeed, be mischievous. Mischievous it has been dur-

ing the whole of this long war against France; but especially, during the war in the Peninsula. Who, to read our public prints, would not imagine, that our army had lived in a continued series of victories? Who would imagine, that the enemy against whom they have to contend was not to the last degree contemptible? In short, such a press, a press so conducted, is the vilest imposture that ever was practised in the world.—As to the effect which the fall of Figueiras will have upon the affairs of Napoleon in Spain, it is not an easy matter to settle; but, that it will have a great effect is pretty certain. The state of things in Spain is such as to promise a result by no means favourable to us. There is a talk of *treasons* at Cadiz; and we know what *treasons*, in such a state of things, always mean. The feeling of the Spanish government is pretty clearly evinced in the recent appointment of General *Lacy* to a considerable command; for, it will be recollected, that this was the gentleman, who, in so able and spirited a manner, *answered the charges of General Graham*. This is an act of a nature entirely unequivocal; and, with this act before them, if there be any persons in England who expect to see harmony restored at Cadiz, all I can say is, that I wish them joy of their happy state of mind.

GERMAN DESERTERS.—In the meanwhile, however, we have, for our comfort, a new freight, it seems, of German Soldiers brought into England from Spain. "The desertions," says the Morning Chronicle of the 3rd instant, "from the French armies have been so numerous since their entrance into Spain, that Government found it necessary to establish a *depot* for them at Gibraltar. From thence they are conveyed to this country, and distributed among the different foreign corps now in our service. Upwards of 1000 German recruits have accordingly arrived at Portsmouth in the course of last week; but it is uncertain whether they are to be formed into a separate corps, or drafted into the several foreign regiments."—These are not the Polish Lancers, I suppose. Not those "savages," as the letters from officers in our army are said to call them. Not those murderous ruffians, who think no more of the life of a man than of that of a dog; and who run their lances into a carcass without the smallest consideration for the muffs and tippets and gloves and

furberows by which it may be enveloped. It would be a good thing to catch these people deserting.—It is curious to observe how the above-mentioned German deserters became "*recruits*" all at once when they are taken up by us. But, if they were at Gibraltar, why send them to England? Why send them into Hampshire? Why not land them at Lisbon, whither we are sending so many troops from England? Why bring them to England from the Peninsula, at the same time that we are sending Englishmen thither? *Why do this?*—"And, why *do you ask these questions?*" says the Morning Chronicle. "You know, as *well as any body, why this is done.*" How do you know that I do? At any rate, it is for you, who have stated the fact, to account for its having taken place.—Indeed, I do not believe this fact. I do not believe, that these Germans ever were in the service of France. It may be said so at Portsmouth, and they may say so themselves; but I do not believe it a bit the more for that. The French armies do not desert. The war in Spain and Portugal has proved that fact. There has been every temptation to desertion, and every opportunity offered; and, yet, where have we ever seen any official return of deserters received from the enemy? If his men did really desert, we should not fail to have the proof of it laid clearly before us, to which there would be such powerful motives; and, as we have seen no such proof, common sense, if we have any left, bids us reject a belief of the fact. But, whence, then, came these "*German Recruits*?" I do not know; nor do I know, that there are any such people in existence; but, if there are, my firm belief is, that they never were in the service of France.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
September 6, 1811.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—FIGUEIRAS.—*News from the Armies in Spain, dated Paris, 29th Aug. 1811.*

Official News from the Armies in Spain.

CATALONIA.—An aide-de-camp of Martinez, the commandant of *Figueiras*, deserted on the 8th of August, and announced that the garrison was in a frightful state of destitution, and reduced to a few ounces of bread and a little water; that,

no longer expecting relief, they had determined to make a desperate attempt and break through with the bayonet: but *Figueiras* was surrounded with a formidable line of circumvallation, more than 4,000 toises in extent; this line was formed by a chain of strong redoubts, connected together by entrenchments and protected by a double row of abattis. For some nights an increased vigilance took place; the Generals spent these nights in the lines; *the Duke of Tarento* had taken the most effectual measures for depriving the enemy of all means of escaping his fate. Having exhausted all his provisions and ammunition, Martinez, on the night of the 16th, attempted to force the lines at the head of all his garrison; he had advanced near the first abattis, when a terrible fire opened upon his column, killed 400 of his men, and compelled him to re-enter the fortress. On the morning of the 19th, he surrendered at discretion, demanding only that life should be spared. The garrison defiled, without arms, upon the glacis; *it still consisted of 3,500 men, and near 350 officers, of whom there was one Field Marshal, several brigadiers, and 80 superior officers; this garrison arrived at Perpignan on the 21st and 22nd. Two thousand men perished in Figueiras by our fire, or by disease, since the commencement of the blockade, which lasted four months.* The place not having been attacked, and all the operations having been confined to those of a rigorous blockade, this important fortress remains untouched. The perseverance and activity displayed by the blockading troops cannot be too highly praised; the artillery and engineers, in their immense labours, have rivalled each other in zeal.

Letter from the Duke of Tarento to his Excellency the Minister at War.—Camp before Figueiras, August 17, 1811.

MONSIEUR DUKE; I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that the effective part of the garrison of *Figueiras*, to the number of 3,500 men, last night unsuccessfully attempted to make their escape.—This general sally took place on the side towards the plain, but the fire of our advanced posts having given notice of it, the enemy was received with so warm a fire of musketry, accompanied with shouts of Long live the Emperor! and by so many shells and chain-shot, that he precipitately retired in disorder to his ramparts; day-break discovered to our view

the field covered with dead, wounded, and shattered remains.—From the account of several superior officers taken this morning, their loss in wounded was numerous; not a man was able to clear the first line of abattis; and they had besides other obstacles to surmount before they could reach our bayonets.—For two days the Spaniards had been employed in breaking and destroying that which they could not carry off or burn; the ovens were destroyed. They had distributed a double ration of brandy and three days' bread. Such is the account which his Excellency the Colonel-General has sent me this morning, at the same time begging to be authorised to take advantage of the confusion and terror which the above reception must have produced in the Spaniards, by summoning them to surrender at discretion, on pain of being put to the sword. Though I place little dependence on the success of this summons, which would hasten, by some days, the surrender of the fortress, yet I have given him authority.—My advanced posts at Liers were attacked yesterday by the Miquelets; I ordered a general beating up, which dispersed them all. It would appear that 7 or 800 of these people were endeavouring to favour the evacuation of the fort.—Every thing leads to a belief that the fall of Figueiras is near at hand. I have the honour, &c.—
(Signed) *The Marshal Duke of Tarento,*
M'DONALD.

LETTER II.—*Camp before Figueiras, August 19, 1811.*

Monsieur Duke; I have the satisfaction to inform your Excellency, that the valour, the zeal, and perseverance of his Majesty's army in Catalonia, have triumphed over the perfidy of the traitors who delivered the fortress of Figueiras to the enemy; they are in irons. That fortress is this day reconquered, and in the power of the Emperor.—The Spanish garrison having in vain attempted to escape in the night of the 16th, and with a loss of 400 men, has been forced to surrender at discretion, and the only favour granted is saving their lives.—It came out of the fortress this morning without arms, 3,500 in number, and about 350 officers, of whom are Field Marshal Martinez, several Generals of Brigade, 80 superior officers, &c.; it was marched in three columns towards Perpignan, where it will arrive on the 21st and 22nd.—This garrison lost, during the blockade, more than 2,000 men by our

fire, or by a natural death; 1,500 sick remained in the hospital, and there are 200 non-combatants, who shall be dismissed.—The army of his Majesty braved more than 60,000 cannon-shot, and two million rounds of musketry, without much loss.

It has borne, with a constancy truly exemplary, labour, fatigue, and the inclemencies of the weather during a blockade of four months and nine days; and since the 24th of July has spent 25 successive nights under arms.—The works of the lines of countervallation and circumvallation are immense; his Majesty will be able to judge of them, should he condescend to look at the plan which I transmit to your Excellency.—The engineer department directed them with constant zeal and activity.—The artillery department has been excellent, as it always is; the General of Division Tamil commands it, and General Nourry erected and pointed all the batteries, some of which were boldly placed at less than 300 toises from the fortress.—The redoubts of the 37th of the line, of the 8th light, 16th and 67th of the line, 32d light, 11th, 81st, 60th, 93rd, those of the Imperial Gendarmerie and of the Westphalians, received the names of the corps which constantly worked there; the first mentioned were within musket-shot of the covered way; the 3d, and 23d light, also laboured a great deal.—These corps under the orders of Generals Quesnel, Clement, Palmarole, Plansonne, Lefebvre, Colonels Lamarque and Petit, formed the line of blockade or reinforced it every night. The squadron of the 20th, and 29th Chasseurs, the squadron of the 24th dragoons, and the lanciers gendarmes, were also in horseback in part.—In fine, a select reserve, consisting of the foot-gendarmerie, and of detachments from different corps, commanded in turn by Generals Favier, Nourry, and Prost, and Adjutant Commandant Nivet, was destined to support all the points that were threatened.—His Excellency the Colonel General was every where. He displayed very great activity; in general every one has perfectly done his duty. I feel pleasure in doing this justice to the army, in the hope that the Emperor will deign to cast a look of favour on these brave men,—also begging your Excellency to cause his Majesty to remark, that his army of Catalonia had nothing to do with the event which brought them under the walls of this place.—I have just displayed the Imperial flag upon the walls; it was saluted by an hundred

rounds of cannon: this salute will be heard by the English ships on the coast, and the assemblages of insurgents at Olot; it will make known to them the recapture of Figueiras and the termination of the war in this part of Catalonia.—I have the honour, &c.—*The Marshal Duke of Tarento,*

P. S. Your Excellency's Aid-de-Camp, the Chief of Battalion Schneider, bearer of this dispatch, has shared in the fatigues of the troops, passing whole nights in the trenches; he has seen the fort, the prisoners, and can give your Excellency all the information which you may think necessary.

Translation of a Letter written by General Juan Antonio Martinez, Commandant of the Fort of San Fernando de Figueiras, to the principal Junta of the Principality of Catalonia.

Pont de Moulin, August 19, 1811.

Most excellent Senor,—After enduring more than four months obstinate blockade, without any relief on the part of the army, I have found myself under the necessity of surrendering the fort of San Fernando de Figueiras, from the total want of provisions. I have employed even the last resources; *from our horses to the lowest insect, all has been eaten up.* On the night of the 16th I attempted a sally at the point of the bayonet, with all the garrison; and in spite of the obstacles which the line of circumvallation opposed, I myself reached the abattis, or trunks of trees obstructing our passage, which could not be effected, in consequence of the great strength of this impenetrable line. In fine, I have this day surrendered prisoner of war, with the garrison, which has been treated by the French *with the generosity which characterizes that nation.*

(Signed) JUAN ANTONIO MARTINEZ.

AMERICAN STATES.—*Proclamation of the President for the Meeting of Congress.*—*24th July, 1811.*

Whereas great and weighty matters, claiming the consideration of the Congress of the United States, form an extraordinary occasion for convening them, I do by these presents appoint Monday, the 4th day of November next, for their meeting at the City of Washington; hereby requiring the respective Senators and the Representatives then and there to assemble in Congress, in order to receive

such communications as may then be made to them, and to consult and determine on such measures as in their wisdom may be deemed meet for the welfare of the United States. In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed, and signed the same with my hand. Done at the City of Washington, the 24th day of July, in the year of our Lord, 1811; and of the independence of the United States the 36th.

JAMES MADISON.

SOUTH AMERICAN REVOLUTION.—*Correspondence and Documents relative to the Revolution at Buenos Ayres, 1811.*

Buenos Ayres Extraordinary Gazette of the 20th of June, 1811.

In the Extraordinary Gazette of the 18th instant, among other official papers which General Don Jose Artigas transmitted with regard to his operations against Monte Video, there was also given an overture made by Don Xavier Elio after the battle of Las Piedras, soliciting the armistice. During this, the result of the negotiation also reached him, which in that extremity he had set on foot directly with the most excellent Junta, through the medium of the officer Don Jose Obregon, and with which the public has already been made acquainted. As Elio perfectly foresaw the rejection which his application, so contemptible in many respects, was doomed to meet with, he visibly attempted to influence the good faith of General Artigas by the insidious mode in which his letter was drawn up, pretending that the English Government was embarked in the same cause, by the instructions which it had actually given to Capt. Heywood, Commander of the Nereus frigate.—Our General, deeply convinced, as well as the Government, of the true sentiments of the English nation with regard to the present affairs, returned a very proper answer: he spoke with a full knowledge of the daring and cunning character of the man to whom it was addressed; and with all the energy and resolution which animates us in our undertaking. But the honourable officer of his Britannic Majesty could not view with indifference the inconsiderate audacity of Elio, who had so falsely compromised his reputation in an affair of so much delicacy, and who, when Capt. Heywood had been expressly charged to observe a complete

neutrality in our affairs, had represented him as to a certain degree, taking part in them. Capt. Heywood, therefore, thought it his duty to clear himself of all such interference, and transmitted to the Government the following declaration, which is published for that purpose, and that all may be apprised of the sole object of his arrival :

On board his Britannic Majesty's Frigate the Nereus, before Buenos Ayres, June 19.

Most Excellent Senor ; In the Buenos Ayres Gazette of yesterday I have observed an official document, in which I am erroneously represented as a negotiator between his Excellency the Viceroy, Don Xavier Elío, and the Most Excellent Provisional Junta of Government. And as, wherever that Gazette is circulated, it may produce an impression injurious to me as Captain in the Royal Navy of his Britannic Majesty, whose duties are of a nature more open, active, and decided than those of a crooked policy and diplomatic intrigue, to which my character is abhorrent; and having, also, received an express prohibition to interfere in these matters, I have thought it necessary to observe for the present, that the Viceroy must have been greatly mistaken in expressing himself as he has done with regard to me.—I also leave it to your Excellency to inform the public (if you think it of importance) whether or not your Excellency, since my arrival in this river in the Nereus, has entered into any official conversation with me, or any other individual, relative to the existing political disputes of these provinces, in which we disclaim all right, and even inclination, to interfere.—Though I have not thought it necessary or proper hitherto to say any thing, yet I now avail myself of this opportunity, that it may be well and clearly understood, that the spirit and tendency of the orders with which I was sent to, and still remain in, the river Plate, have in truth for their chief and only object the protection of the persons and commerce of the subjects of his Britannic Majesty from any unjust effects of commotion; and to lend all possible assistance, by means of the ship under my command, to such of them as may wish to remit their property or retire from the river Plate.—In the execution of this last part of my orders, I consider it my duty to endeavour to obtain the co-operation of this Government, for their own benefit, and that of my

countrymen. Why this co-operation has been so suddenly and unexpectedly denied, is a question which I have neither the right nor the inclination to ask, and with regard to which it becomes me, as an officer of the English Navy, to be perfectly indifferent.—I have the honour to be, &c.
To the President and Members of the Provisional Junta of Government. P. HEYWOOD.

The following is the letter of the Viceroy to General Artigas, conveyed by a flag of truce, and to which the preceding correspondence refers :

Monte Video, May 20.

I have to inform you, that I have set on foot negociations with the Junta of Buenos Ayres, through the medium of Capt. Heywood, of the British frigate Nereus, which officer has also instructions from his Government to the same effect. One of the propositions which he has to make to the Junta, is, that an armistice and suspension of arms should take place till our existing differences can be accommodated. I expect from day to day accounts of this negociation, and in the mean time I hope you will concur in the humane sentiments which animate me, by suspending all hostilities between our troops, as producing only a lamentable and useless effusion of blood; as the Junta must comply with the pacific propositions made by the English and myself.—The reply of General Artigas was in substance as follows :—

Camp at Las Piedras, May 20.

Senor ; The cause of the people does not admit of the least delay. If you really desire to avoid the effusion of blood, so contrary to the feelings of humanity, enter into a negociation with me, who am well acquainted with the wishes of the Junta, and will give you and Monte Video a new proof of its generous and pacific views. These are comprised in the re-establishment of communication and relation between the inhabitants of Monte Video and those of the capital; ties marked out by the mutual interests of both, and by nature itself; ties which are broken by a declaration of war on your part, which has carried desolation and mourning into those families which have suffered from that effusion of blood which you profess to lament.—This army will shortly bring to a conclusion the work which is already so far advanced; and you will bring to a climax the misfortunes of Monte Video, unless you resolve that the autho-

rity of the Provincial Junta of these provinces be recognised by that city, in order that it may transmit its wishes by the medium of a Representative, conformable to the regulation which has been published, and in imitation of the measures which all the provinces in Spain adopted for the purpose of preserving entire the dominions of our august Sovereign Don Ferdinand VII. from the oppression of the tyrant of Europe. This is the only condition on which, in virtue of the authority which I exercise, I shall cause hostilities to cease on the part of my troops.

(Signed) JOSE ARTIGAS.

From the Buenos Ayres Gazette of the 15th June.

Letter from his Excellency Lord Strangford to this Most Excellent Junta.

Most Excellent Senor; I have received the letter of your Excellency of the 24th of February, in which you inform me of the proceedings of General Elio, in interrupting the commerce of Buenos Ayres, and in which, after some observations on the supposed want of legitimate official authority on the part of that General, you beg me to communicate them to my Government. On this point I will comply with your Excellency's wishes; but I am convinced that I only anticipate the opinion of my Court, when I assure you, that this communication will be received with the deepest regret, and will augment those painful feelings which must be inspired by the present unfortunate contest between Buenos Ayres and its dependencies. —The confidence which your Excellency has placed in me, and the conviction that I shall acquire a new title to it by the proposal which I am about to submit to your consideration, encourage me to speak frankly and without reserve. —Your Excellency, by constantly expressing a fixed determination to adhere to the common cause of the Allies against France, to respect the authority and preserve the claims of our legitimate Sovereign, have secured an undoubted right to the friendship and good offices of Great Britain, founded on a basis much more solid and extensive, than that of the advantages and concessions which you have so liberally and wisely granted to its subjects. —But it is nevertheless to be lamented, that while these principles deserve every applause, their practical results have hitherto so little corresponded to their tenour; and that, in a crisis which requires united efforts and

undivided energy, the power of the confederation formed against France should be weakened by the failure of those resources, which might rationally be expected from those who are in no small degree interested in the event of the struggle, but who, unhappily, cannot contribute to its fortunate issue, because they are plunged in all the evils of civil dissension. —Your Excellency knows too well the scrupulous good faith of the Court of London, the sacred ties which connect it with Spain, and the great and universally important object of their mutual alliance, to believe, that Great Britain, without violating that faith, sacrificing these obligations, and abandoning these objects, can lend the sanction of her approbation to measures productive of dissension between the component parts of a coalition, the happy issue of which depends upon a cordial co-operation and good understanding among all its constituent members. —But though it is thus impossible for Great Britain to act in opposition to her obligations, and the interests of the just cause which she supports, the just claims which your Excellency has to her friendship, inspire her with a sincere desire to become instrumental to your happiness and prosperity in the only way in which she can at present promote these objects. —I therefore take upon me to offer to your Excellency, in the most ample manner, the good offices and friendly interpositions of the English Government, for the purpose of facilitating an amicable settlement of the differences which at present subsist between the Spaniards of both hemispheres, and delivering them from the greatest of all calamities—civil discord, as the origin of their ruin, and of the greatest danger to the common cause. —I offer this mediation to your Excellency in the firm confidence that it will be undertaken with promptness by the English Government, and in the knowledge of what has been already proposed and accepted by other parts of the Spanish Monarchy, which were in circumstances similar to those in which Buenos Ayres is now placed. —I beg your Excellency clearly to understand, that the proposal which I make does not involve any disposition on the part of my Court to interpose in the political affairs of the Spanish Monarchy, or to support any system inconsistent with liberality and justice, and with the permanent prosperity of Spanish America. —It does not appear possible,

that your Excellency can confide your cause in better hands than those of England. Every motive of interest and policy unites in declaring, that the prosperity of Buenos Ayres must be to us an object of importance; and this consideration, founded on identity of interests, is calculated to produce the most unlimited confidence on the part of your Excellency.—Should the proposal which I have had the honour to make be adopted by your Excellency, I would suggest as the first step to its actual execution, the adoption of measures for an armistice between your Excellency and General Elio; nothing can be more simple than such a negotiation: the withdrawal of your Excellency's troops on the one side, and the cessation of the blockade on the other, would be just measures of mutual concession. It might be stipulated, that this armistice should last till the final adjustment, under the friendly mediation of Great Britain, of the points at present in discussion between the government of Buenos Ayres and that of Spain.—A proposition of this nature, so analogous to the moderation which has characterised the commencement of your Excellency's proceedings, would cover Buenos Ayres with honour; and even should it be rejected, the very fact of having made so equitable an offer would prove, that you had left no means untried to avert the calamities of civil war, while the party that refused to accede to so just a measure would be in a great degree responsible for them.—Your Excellency cannot fail to perceive the various immediate advantages which would result from this proposal. The restoration of commerce would instantly follow; the termination of the difficulties under which British agents have laboured in this part of the world; and the removal of every disposition to interfere in the affairs of Spanish America, which may have been felt by any other State under the influence of the jealousies excited by the military movements and political proceedings of its neighbours.—I think it proper to apprise your Excellency, that I have also written to General Elio on the subject to which this letter relates, and that I have laboured to produce in him a disposition, corresponding to that which I confidently hope and believe is felt by your Excellency.—I conclude by again requesting your Excellency's attention to the proposition which I have had the honour to make; and that you will favour me with

your sentiments upon it, as soon as you conveniently can; and to believe that I am solely actuated by a sincere desire for your peace and prosperity, and for the prosperous issue of the just contest in which we are equally engaged, and in which we cannot hope to conquer if we are divided among ourselves.—I have the honour, &c.

STRANGFORD.

Answer of the Junta.

Most Excellent Senor; The Junta has received by Captain Heywood, of the Navy, the confidential letter addressed to them by your Excellency, acknowledging the receipt of theirs of the 24th of February. It is not difficult to discover the reasons of your Excellency's silence on the most material part of its contents, nor of your answer to the last, dated March 6th, even had it not been ascertained by other channels, that your Excellency, acknowledging those ports to be in a state of blockade, even to ships of your own nation, chose rather to give a silent refusal, notwithstanding the reasons in opposition to it.—This unexpected event, and the excessive exertions of Admiral De Courcy to free the British flag from the obstructions put many months before, by the Government of Monte Video, to there being free ports, present to us a very mortifying contrast. The Junta can assign no cause for this retrograde movement, unless it form part of the plan of the British Government to adopt no measures that may tend to disunite America from Spain. The Junta, however, cannot reconcile such inconsistent projects. It is certain that the commercial projects of Great Britain and America have nothing to do with this disunion.—If Spain should ever renounce her system of exclusion with respect to America, it is time for her to know that in the state of insignificance in which she is, her true interest consists in soliciting England to approach these sources, whence she may supply that strength which she has exhausted for the interests of Spain, and be enabled to clothe a people left naked by Spanish tyranny; at least, in this way, she might acquire an idea of gratitude and justice; but she chuses rather to be deficient on this score, than to renounce exclusive rights, to which she believes herself to be entitled to all eternity, declaring imperiously, by her emissary, General Elio, those ports to be in a state of blockade, and issuing express orders to annihilate the British

commerce in this quarter; while she cannot reconcile such conduct with her declaration of attachment to Great Britain, her ally, she gives the highest offence to the Colonies, who, as subject to the same King, have equal right with Galicia, the Asturias, and Catalonia, to a direct intercourse with the nation that affords them protection. These reasons are of weight sufficient to convince the Junta, that without any violation of the good faith pledged to Spain, and without a breach of any positive agreement, the Court of London may resist the blockade which General Elio has imposed upon British ships.—Your Excellency observes, that it is matter of regret, that, in the present crisis, the power of the confederacy against France should be weakened for want of resources. The Junta is of opinion, that, to avoid the prejudices of which your Excellency speaks, and not to come to a state of the greatest weakness, the most effectual way is, not to place the resources of America in the hands of Spain, without making them pass to England, by means of an open and unrestricted commerce.—The whole world is not ignorant how incapable Spain is to employ her public funds with economy, as well as to direct her armies, because she has already dilapidated the supplies remitted from America for her defence. Such contributions of loyalty and of honour ought to be kept sacred; their disposition was determined by the same necessities, and the intention of those who granted them. Notwithstanding this, no consideration was sufficient to limit the prodigality and covetousness of the Spanish Administrations, yet they now haughtily ask, who has provided funds sufficient to support so many years the expences of the armies? These provinces profess entire fidelity to Ferdinand the Seventh; they wish to direct only by themselves, and without the hazard of risking their means to the rapacity of unfaithful hands; they promise to enter into the coalition against the tyrant so long as their civil independence is acknowledged. Here your Excellency will observe a means of strengthening the power of the confederation, till a final success, much more secure and more conformable to the principles of equity, than by threatening us with menaces, punishments, and blockades, into a subordination which no person has a right to require.—Your Excellency may be firmly assured that the blockade imposed by General

Elio is more prejudicial to the interests of Great Britain, and to Spain herself, than it is to us. If the scrupulous considerations of your nation carries it to dissemble such aggressions, the Junta cannot propose to the people such a species of humiliation. They can perceive in it nothing else than a determination to resist the audacious attempts of a Chief, who, without any other authority than a simple letter from the Secretary Bardaxi, his relation, exhibits himself a hostile Viceroy. It was this circumstance which hastened the aversion they formerly bore in their minds, and made the people of the eastern province take up arms. They demanded assistance from this Junta, and they have confined their aggressions to investing the walls of Monte Video.—In this state of things, the armistice which the conciliating disposition of your Excellency proposes, can produce no other effects than to frustrate an enterprize already far advanced; to expose the safety of many patriots to the vengeance of Elio; to excite an universal convulsion among the provinces, and the abandonment of our expectation to fluctuating opinion. This would surely be acting contrary to the principles of our institution, and to raise again the colonial system which our hands destroyed. This Junta entertain too sublime an idea of the penetration of your Excellency, to attribute your proposal to any other motive than an acquaintance with occurrences which are obscured by distance.—In respect to the mediation, which your Excellency has proposed to remove the differences which subsists between these States and the Peninsula, nothing could be more satisfactory to this Junta than to place their cause in hands so faithful and generous as those of the British Cabinet. The good faith which characterize it, and the identity of their interests with ours, are causes which assures us of its fidelity. But the Junta cannot discover reasons to authorise them at present to avail themselves of such mediation. The Peninsula is no more than a part of the Spanish Monarchy, and that so maimed, that it would be no small concession to put it upon an equality with America. It therefore follows, from this principle, that the Peninsula cannot hold any authority over America, nor this over that. Were the English Cabinet to act the part of an impartial Mediator, it would be a precise acknowledgment of the independence of the two States. On the

other hand, were the British Cabinet possessed of an idea of our inferiority, it would not be surprising that the result of a negotiation would be, to grant us much more by favour than we deserved in justice. Therefore, until we can know the opinion of the British nation, all ulterior proceedings should be suspended. In addition, your Excellency combines your mediation with the armistice, and should a negotiation take place, General Elio would continue to hold all the authority of Viceroy, wherewith he is invested by the Junta of Cadiz, even here, where he now occupies; but this would involve a contradiction in principles; Elio, and the illegitimate power from which he derives his authority, would remain triumphant over our rights before the termination of the dispute.—The unlimited confidence which the Junta has in the pure intentions of your Excellency, convinces us that you have no other object in view than to unite the political ties which subsist in common betwixt both nations; but your Excellency may rest assured, that if the state of our negotiations do not admit us to adhere to them, our friendship towards Great Britain shall not be less firm, nor our consideration of your Excellency. God preserve your Excellency many years.

From the Members of the Junta,

Buenos Ayres, May 18, 1811.

To his Excellency Lord Strangford, &c.

Buenos Ayres, June 14.

This day entered this capital the veteran troops of infantry and dragoons which the kingdom of Chili has sent to us to support the just cause in which we are equally engaged. The General Commandant, at the head of all the regiments, marched out to receive them, at the distance of a quarter of a league from the city; and incorporated with our warlike legions, amidst the acclamations of a numerous population, they were conducted to the great square, in front of the town-hall, in the balconies of which, the Junta and the Members of the Municipality were assembled. There they renewed the most solemn oaths to die with us, should it be necessary, for the destruction of tyranny, and in defence of the imprescriptible rights of our native soil, that our children at least may enjoy the precious gift of liberty. They have come determined not to return to their homes without the palm of victory. Let the haughty despot and his followers be filled with terror;

and consider, that if Buenos Ayres alone was at one time able to inflict punishment on much *more powerful enemies*, his intrigues, his machinations, his miserable power, and his threats are perfectly contemptible when opposed to the united force of America.

Buenos Ayres, June 10.

Letter from the Conde de Linhares, Portuguese Minister at Rio Janeiro, to the Junta. Rio Janeiro, April 27, 1811.

Most Excellent Senor;—Don Manuel Sarratea, who has just arrived here, delivered to me your letter, which I have laid before the Prince Regent, my master. His Highness has charged me to assure you, that he feels, and is always anxious to maintain with the Junta and people of Buenos Ayres, the same sentiments of friendship and good harmony to which he is bound by the alliance which happily unites him with his Catholic Majesty. Your Excellency knows the good faith and entire impartiality by which his Royal Highness is actuated. You are not ignorant how much he desires the conservation of the Spanish Monarchy, and to secure the eventual rights of his august spouse; your Excellency must therefore naturally suppose how anxious he is to see union and harmony re-established among all parts of the Spanish dominions, and with what pain he has witnessed the commencement of a civil war on the very frontiers of his States. He is of course particularly anxious for its termination, to which he would most willingly contribute by all the means which can be suggested by the friendship and impartiality which he feels for all the subjects of his Christian Majesty. In obedience to the Royal orders which I have received, I feel great satisfaction in making this declaration of the sentiments of his Royal Highness, which I hope will be agreeable to your Excellency. May God preserve, &c.

CONDE DE LINHAREZ.

Reply of the Junta.

Most Excellent Senor;—This Junta has learned, with the greatest satisfaction, the pacific sentiments with which his Royal Highness the Prince Regent is impressed, and his anxious desire to contribute, by all amicable means, to the restoration of that harmony which has been unfortunately interrupted among those who have the honour to be the subjects of the same Monarch. Had the prejudices of the

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Spanish Government permitted them calmly to attend to our rights, and had not the former depositaries of the royal authority in this part of America been resolved to act contrary to the evidence of facts, by disseminating every where doubts and errors, our loyalty would have been much more confirmed, and even the remains of civil discord would have disappeared from among us. But, unfortunately, guided the most of them, by personal views, they introduced the deadly germs of division, which, though put down in the greater part of this viceroyalty, is still committing ravages in the province of Paraguay, and within the walls of Monte Video.—The public papers will have informed your Excellency of the just and undeniable ground on which, without prejudice to our allegiance to Ferdinand VII, we have founded our right to resume the management of our own affairs. As to the dissensions more immediately in your vicinity, it is equally notorious that the object of the military expedition to Paraguay was no other than to place the inhabitants of that province, confined to an angle of the kingdom, in a situation to deliberate on the means of saving the State from the subversion which threatened it. But they chose rather to listen to the suggestions of ill-designing men, who were interested in their errors, than to the wise counsel of their brothers. Hence it happened that hostilities took place. But the Junta, whose first object was to spare the blood of their Countrymen, viewed these disasters with horror, and ordered all hostilities to cease, leaving to time the work of undeceiving the Paraguayans.—With regard to the affairs of Monte Video, the Junta of Cadiz were so inconsiderate as to place at the head of affairs Don F. Xavier Elio, with the respectable title of Viceroy. This audacious man, whose instinct for destruction is notorious, since his arrival in these parts, has not ceased to treat us as rebels—to denounce against us the vengeance of the law—to blockade our ports—to make preparations to reduce us by force; and, in fine, to irritate the inhabitants of the Eastern district by the sacrifices which he exacts, and the miseries to which he reduced them.—The inhabitants being placed in this cruel situation, prudence obliged them to resort to violent measures; they rose in a mass, and demanded assistance from this capital. The Junta would have been criminally indifferent to the distresses

of their neighbours, had they not sent them aid. They therefore, dispatched some troops, who have in part arrested the current of these misfortunes.—The Junta have thought proper to explain to your Excellency the motives of their separation from Spain, and to give a brief exposition of the most recent events. They trust that his Royal Highness the Prince Regent will be enabled to judge from this statement, that neither the ultramarine Spaniards, nor Elio, nor his followers the Europeans in Monte Video, are entitled in any degree to his protection, in prejudice to our just cause.—Upon the whole, the Junta will never lose sight of the considerations with which they ought to be impressed as subjects of their king. They wish the happy moment to be accelerated, when we shall see Ferdinand VII. restored to the throne of his ancestors, and when all of us, reconciled, shall labour in concert in supporting without alteration the rights of the crown. Doubtless the powerful influence of the Prince Regent, your master, might smooth the difficulties in the way of such an event. But considering that by the general wish of the people, it has been thought necessary to convoke their Representatives for the purpose of discussing those difficult questions which have been excited by the passing occurrences, and for securing the interests of the nation, it is the opinion of this Junta, that without the consent of that Congress, it would be premature to enter into any measures of negotiation with Spain. The same obstacles are not opposed to our reconciliation with the city of Monte Video. The consanguinity of its inhabitants, the vicinity of their territory, and their intimate relations with this metropolis, all concur in exciting a desire for our reunion. The Junta will therefore receive any proposition that may be made to them through the medium of his Royal Highness, but will not compromise the interests which have been entrusted to them.—God preserve, &c.

Buenos Ayres, May 16, 1811.

To his Excellency the Conde de Linhares.

Buenos Ayres, June 26.

Our army at present consists of 22,000 warriors, the flower of the provinces, without including the Indians, who voluntarily join the service, and chiefly convey the artillery and baggage. They are not all, to be sure, armed with muskets, but a considerable part of them are. Our cavalry

are provided with every kind of side arms; and are able of themselves to rout those miserable legions, from whom the efforts of their chiefs have not been able to conceal the injustice of their cause.

Circular of the Junta to the Cabildos of the United Provinces.

Nothing is more important to the great objects which this Junta promotes, than to see the moment arrive when the provinces shall be represented in a Congress which shall commence its weighty deliberations. And, as notwithstanding the repeated invitations, which have been issued for the purpose of hastening the arrival of a day which will be the most remarkable in the future annals of America, a number of the deputies of which that august assembly is to be composed have not yet arrived, the Junta, therefore, on account of its pressing importance to the State, have resolved that the National Congress shall commence its sittings about the end of November in the present year. In consequence, the Government requires you to accelerate the mission of your representatives, and that one at least be elected for each of the cities in your districts; with this understanding, that should unforeseen difficulties prevent you from carrying the measure into effect within the time prefixed, supplementary Deputies will be appointed, till they arrive who are legitimately invested with powers from their constituents. —This Resolution is communicated to you, that you may with zeal and love for the cause of your country, take all necessary measures for hastening the assembling of the said Representatives in this city.

Buenos Ayres, June 26, 1811.

FRANCE.—Decree relative to Prisoners of War. Aug. 5, 1811.

Prisoners of war, having the rank of officers, as well as hostages, shall enjoy the favour of proceeding freely and without escort to the place assigned for them, and to reside there, without being detained, after their having given their parole not to depart from the road marked out for them, nor from the place of their residence. —Every prisoner of war having the

rank of officer, and every hostage, who, after having given his parole, shall violate it, shall, if he be retaken, be considered and treated as a soldier with respect to pay and rations, and shut up in a citadel, fort, or castle. —Prisoners of war having the rank of officers and hostages, who shall not enjoy the favour granted by the first article of the present decree, shall be kept in the depôts, and shall not travel but under the escort of the armed force. If they escape on the road, or from a dépôt, and be retaken, they shall be confined in a citadel, fort, or castle. —Prisoners of war who have not the rank of officers, and who escape either on the road, or from a dépôt, from the battalion of the establishment, or from the houses of private persons, where they may have been placed, shall, in case they are retaken, be confined in a citadel, fort, or castle.

FRANCE.—Address to the Emperor from La Lippe and from the Ionian Isles, together with his Imperial Majesty's Answers—Paris, 19th Aug. 1811.

Yesterday, and Sunday the 18th, before Mass, the Emperor, surrounded by the Princes, grand Dignitaries, the Ministers, the grand Eagles of the Legion of Honour, &c. received in the Hall of the Throne a deputation from the department of La Lippe, and another from the Ionian Isles. The Duc de Looz, President of the deputation from La Lippe, presented the following address :

SIRE ; The deputies of the department of La Lippe, authorised by the clemency of your Imperial Majesty to deposit at the foot of your throne the most respectful expressions of the submission and gratitude of a people newly united to your Empire, amidst the imposing spectacle of the grandeur and of the power of the first Monarch of the universe, feel themselves encouraged by the thought that they speak in the name of the descendants of those ancient Germans, whose valour long balanced the fortune of the Roman eagles, and who have been always remarked for the uprightness and loyalty of their character, and for a steady attachment to their sovereigns and their laws.

(To be continued.)